Would the United States Defend Canada? | Maclean's | November 1st, 1936 (2022)

Would the United States Defend Canada?

DOES THE Monroe Doctrine apply to Canada? Would the United States actually go to war to protect her Canadian neighbors from foreign aggression? Could the Dominion count on the assistance of the American military, naval and air forces in the event of an attack from a European or Asiatic power?

What stand would the United States be likely to take if Canada were involved in a Britisn or a League of Nations war? Would she stand between the Dominion and the inevitable risks of such a war, such as gas attacks on Halifax, Montreal, Toronto or Vancouver? Would she permit an armed foreign force to land on Canadian soil? Would she resist the permanent conquest or occupation of Canada by a non-American power?

If the Monroe Doctrine does apply to Canada, what effect would this have on Canadian foreign policy? Would it necessitate a closer alignment between the policies of

Canada and the United States? Would Canada's position as a North American nation conflict with her position as a part of the British Empire and a member of the League of Nations? What would be Canada’s situation in an AngloAmerican war?

How would the protection of Canada by the United States affect the question Empire defense? Of Canadian defense?

These are vital questions, to which Canadians should be giving careful and sane thought. They cannot be approached successfully with half-facts and preconceived prejudices. We need to know something of the historical attitude of the United States under the Monroe Dex trine, as well as the current American viewpoints regarding

the defense of Canada. Technically, there is some doubt whether the Doctrine, in its strictest sense, does apply to Canada, since the Dominion is not an independent, sovereign state, but a semiindependent part of the British Empire. It may interest Canadians to know that the Department of State in Washington handles Canadian affairs, with those of Great Britain, under the Division of Western European Affairs.

In its broader interpretations, however, there seems to be little doubt that the Monroe Doctrine does apply to

Canada; or, at least, that the United States would defend Canada from foreign aggression, if only in self-protection. President Roosevelt made it clear that this was his view when, in his recent speech at Quebec, he stated that the United States would defend her “neighborhood.” His speech was considered especially significant in view of the growing tension in Europe and Asia.

Mr. Roosevelt’s actual words were:

“Of all the nations of the world today, we are in many ways most singularly blessed. Our closest neighbors are good neighbors. If there are remoter nations that wish us not good but ill, they know that we are strong; they know that we can and will defend ourselves and defend our neighborhood.”

In Canada, there has been a considerable stir over this newest expression of what is essentially the same old familiar doctrine followed by Presidents and Secretaries of State from President Monroe to the present time. In some quarters there has been an inclination to exaggerate the nature of the protection proffered by the American President, and to assume that Canada could now rest comfortably on the United States for her defense in all emergencies. Only a complete lack of knowledge of the United States foreign policy and of the historical applications of the Monroe Doctrine, could lead to such a conclusion.

On the other hand, there are Canadians who have waxed indignant over the mere suggestion that the Dominion might ever need United States protection. Apparently, they saw Mr. Roosevelt’s friendly gesture in the light of an alternative to the traditional protection of the British Navy and of Empire defenses, rather than as supplementary to them.

Their attitude seems scarcely warrantable. In the first place, Mr. Roosevelt’s reference to “our neighborhood” applies quite as much, possibly more, to Mexico and the Caribbean as to Canada. Second and more important, the United States would presumably come to the defense of Canada only when this country was invaded or directly threatened with invasion, which, by the very nature of things, could occur only in the eventuality of a complete breakdown of the British naval and aerial defenses, or at a time when the British Navy was concentrating its forces in the protection of some far-flung portion of the Empire. In other words, Canada can be invaded by an overseas power only after the British Navy and Air Force have failed to prevent an invasion ; and if such a situation should ever occur, is there anyone who would not welcome every scrap of military, naval or aerial assistance that a neighbor might offer?

We are apt to take a non-realistic view of what might happen in another war in which the British Empire was involved. Because the British Navy was able to do a pretty effectual job of bottling up the German Navy in the last war, we forget that in a future war Great Britain might face a naval power or combination of naval powers who could not be bottled up and who could carry on the attack in many seas at one time. The simultaneous defense of such widely separated portions of the globe as South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and India, which have no strong neighbors to scare off invaders, of Canada which is susceptible to invasion from two ocean fronts, and of the home seas around Great Britain and Ireland, is no easy job for any navy—even if recent advances in aviation had not completely changed the character of modern warfare so as to nullify much of the protective power of navies anyway.

Thus, without any lessening of Empire ties or any minimizing of Empire defense, it is of vast import to Canada to know as nearly as possible what the United States stand would be in any given set of circumstances, should Canada be involved in war.

What Is the Monroe Doctrine?

THE DIRECT method of seeking the information is of little avail. I spent some weeks in Washington recently and I learned a good deal about the Monroe Doctrine. I also discovered that governments can be extraordinarily reticent. Departments of State do not care to discuss

hypothetical cases, nor even to commit themselves to broad expressions of principle. But a great deal may be deduced as to the United States probable line of action from a study of the 113 years operation of that curious and unique instrument of foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine.

The Monroe Doctrine is one of the great intangibles in international affairs. Originally enunciated by President James Monroe in his message to Congress on December 2, 1823, it has been so added to and altered by later interpretations and corollaries as to defy accurate definition. In its simplest tenus, the Doctrine is a declaration that the United States will resist any further colonization or conquest of any portion of the American continents.

Monroe’s message was called forth by two concrete situations—the threat of the Holy Alliance to aid Spain in regaining her South American colonies, and the Russian edict proclaiming the 51st parallel of latitude as the southern boundary of Alaska. The Holy Alliance, probably the strongest international union Europe has seen, ruled European affairs with an iron hand from 1815 to 1823. It consisted of a federation of most of the European powers, under the domination of Austria, Prussia and Russia, for the express purpose of maintaining absolute monarchy and preventing the spread of republican principles of government. It was diametrically opposed to all that the United States stood for, and not unnaturally the young Republic viewed with alarm any proposed extension of the Alliance’s power. It is doubtful if Monroe had any idea that he was laying down a permanent policy for the United States; he simply met the situation at hand.

Referring to the Russian controversy, he declared “that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.”

Of the Spanish-American situation, he said: “But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it . . we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”

Canada has always occupied a somewhat anomalous position in relation to the Doctrine. It seems clear that President Monroe had in mind only the independent LatinAmerican states and the unsettled areas of the West and Northwest. In fact, he expressly excepted the existing colonies of European powers—“With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere.”

Certainly it would not occur to him that the colonies or dependencies of any of the great European powers might ever need the protection of the young, weak United States. In 1823 the United States had a population of 11,000,000, approximately that of Canada today; she was only the second American power in respect to territory. Great Britain being the first; and only fourth in military and naval strength, being exceeded by Great Britain, France and Russia.

Interpretations of Doctrine

DURING the next fifty years, however, the United States entered upon her greatest period of expansion; and the spirit of annexation became rife. Canada in those days—or rather the four British colonies, Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick—may well have feared and distrusted the Monroe Doctrine, for there was much unofficial talk of using it to pry the British loose from North America and making the continent into one nation.

The Monroe Doctrine was invoked officially only twice in regard to Canada. The first time was during the dispute between the United States and Great Britain for the possession of the Oregon territory, when President Polk declared that the Doctrine would “apply with greatly increased force should any European power attempt to establish any new colony in North America.” The compromise settlement reached the following year, 1846, setting the boundary at the 49th parallel, recognized that British Columbia was to be henceforward

British. The second invocation of the Doctrine occurred at the time of Confederation, when certain members of Congress took alarm at the thought of a monarchical government in North America, and more particularly at the establishment of a viceroyalty. The House of Representatives passed a resolution deprecating “a confederation of states on this continent, extending from ocean to ocean, established without consulting the people of the provinces to be united, and founded ujxm monarchical principles;” but the Senate took no action, and the matter was dropped.

Since then, the people of the United States have come to realize that Canada is voluntarily and permanently British. The relations between the two countries are of the most friendly; and the United States appears well content with the status quo.

Furthermore, the sharp distinctions between monarchy and democracy no longer exist. Great Britain’s constitutional monarchy is one of the world’s great democracies. Canada, though part of the British Empire, is practically an independent country, with her own Minister to Washington and her own representation on world councils. The United States fought side by side with Canada and Great Britain in the Great War; and these three great commonwealths have been drawn closer together in the face of the present alarming growth of dictatorships.

There is no longer any slightest question of the Monroe Doctrine being used as a weapon against Canada remaining a part of the British Empire. The significant question today is: How far and under what circumstances would the Monroe Doctrine be likely to protect Canada against foreign invasion?

The Kaiser Called Of! His Warships

WOULI) THE United States go to war in defense of the Monroe Doctrine?

The United States has never actually gone to war on behalf of the Doctrine, but she has threatened three times to do so, and in each case her threat was sufficient to bring about acquiescence to her demands.

The first occasion was also the most flagrant violation of the Doctrine which has ever been attempted the conquest of Mexico by the French. Under the pretext of collecting claims, a French army invaded Mexico in 1863 and set up an Empire under Maximilian, brother of the Emperor of Austria. This project was carried out while the United States was engaged in the Civil War and unable to back up her protests. As soon as the war was over, however, the American troops were concentrated along the Rio Grande. The French decided to call their army home.

The second episode, which brought the United States to the verge of war with Great Britain, arose from the dispute over the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana in 1897, when the United States backed Venezuela in her demand for arbitration. The situation was saved when Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Minister, agreed to arbitrate.

The third instance occurred when Germany was bombarding Venezuela in the collection of claims, in 1902, and refused to arbitrate. President Theodore Roosevelt threatened to send the fleet to Venezuela unless, within fortyeight hours, the Kaiser agreed to arbitration. The Kaiser agreed.

Although the United States has never actually gone to war on behalf of the Doctrine, she has evidenced her willingness to take this step, if necessary, to maintain it. Nobody really knows just how strong the Doctrine is, for no nation has been willing to test the issue at the risk of war with the United States—not within recent years.

Doctrine Not a Pledge

TS THE Doctrine a pledge? Is the Doctrine a promise to the countries of North and South America that the United States will protect them from invasion by an extra-continental power? When the Doctrine was first proclaimed, the Latin-

Does the Monroe Doctrine apply to Canada? How does it affect Canada's position in the Empire? In the League?—A searching article on a vital question


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Would the United States Defend Canada ?

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American countries interpreted it in that light, and were eager to form a league or alliance of all the American nations which would give definite pledges of mutual protection. To their great disappointment, the United States always held aloof from any such definite commitment.

Within three years of Monroe’s original statement there was a strong revulsion of feeling in the United States, when it was realized that the new South and Central American states were resting on the Doctrine as a “right.”

In 1826, Secretary of State Clay made it clear that: “The declaration must be

regarded as having been voluntarily made, and not as conveying any pledge or obligation, the performance of which foreign nations have a right to demand.”

Nearly a century later, President Woodrow Wilson declared: “The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It always has been maintained, and always will be maintained, upon her own responsibility.” Clearly, the Monroe Doctrine isa purely unilateral policy of the United States; a gift freely bestowed, a reasonably effective guarantee of protection, but one which is exercised solely at the discretion of the United States. 11 has never been embodied in a treaty or defensive alliance, the United States always having reserved the freedom to act, in any crisis, in whatever manner she saw fit.

There have been many instances of minor violations of the Doctrine in which the United States has either overlooked the infraction, or protested mildly, or lent her “moral support” to the victim. Most of these occurred in the early days of the Doctrine, while the United States was still a comparatively weak country. There have also been compromises, particularly with Great Britain, who acquired territory in Central America and extended and consolidated her holdings in Western Canada after the Doctrine was announced. On the whole, however, the United States has upheld the Doctrine fairly consistently. But she is under no compulsion to do so, if at any time the insistence on the Doctrine should not seem in the best interests of the United States herself.

At present there is a strong movement under way to transform the Monroe Doctrine into a multilateral pact of mutual defense at the forthcoming Pan-American Congress, scheduled to be held in Buenos Aires in December. If this step should be taken, Canada would be placed in a very peculiar relation to such a revamped Monroe Doctrine, for she has never joined the Pan-American Union. The protection of the United States, however, would not be greatly affected, for Canada’s proximity makes her defense practically a matter of self-protection. Doctrine or no Doctrine.

Protection Against C onquest

DOES THE Doctrine protect the countries of the Western Hemisphere from permanent conquest by non-American powers?


The only really serious invasion of the Americas since the declaration by Monroe was the conauest of Mexico by the French, the results of which we have already noted. During the Civil War, also, Spain annexed Santo Domingo, but the Dominicans successfully resisted without outside assistance.

The moral force of the Doctrine in preventing attempts at invasion is impossible to gauge, but has undoubtedly been great. It is generally believed that the United States well-known attitude has exerted a strong influence in keeping Japan out of Mexico and Germany out of South Brazil.

The United States objection to letting

non-American powers get even a foothold on the American continents, has extended to transfer and sale of territory, as well as invasion and conquest. President Grant set forth the principle in 1870 “that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power”—this principle applying with equal force to voluntary cession by independent Latin-American states and to the transfer of European colonies or dependencies to another European power. Applied to Canada, this means that the United Sttates, while quite content that Canada should remain British, would be most unwilling to see the Dominion become a dependency of any other European nation. And as Canada feels the same way, that makes it practically unanimous.

The Magdalena Bay episode, in 1912, made it clear that the Monroe Doctrine applied to Asiatic as well-as European incursions on the American continents, and that the United States would object to the sale of any strategic positions to nonAmerican powers. A rumor spread that Japan was attempting to gain control of the strategic harbor at Magdalena Bay, in the Mexican territory of Southern California, through the purchase of land by a Japanese company. This was denied by the United States Secretary of State, but the Senate, alarmed, went ahead and passed a resolution against the possession, by any non-American government, of any harbor or strategic military or naval position on the American continents such as might threaten the safety of the United States.

In the light of this episode, it is safe to assume that the United States would object to any similar attempts to purchase islands or harbors off the coast of British Columbia on the route to Alaska, or any strategic positions along the St. Lawrence River, the Great Lakes, the Gaspé Peninsula, or even the coast of Labrador. Canada is not very apt to want to dismember herself by such sales, so again there would appear to be no real conflict with the United States viewpoint.

Canada is vitally interested, however, in knowing what the United States stand would be if the Dominion should be made the subject of an invasion of conquest either from the Pacific or the Atlantic.

While I was in Washington, I discussed this question of the protection of Canada with persons usually well informed on the attitude of the State Department. I was told that, if an attempt should ever be made to set up a Manchoukuo in British Columbia, or if any European dictator should try to establish a colony in Canada, the United States would undoubtedly intervene.

Nothing in the Doctrine prevents the United States herself from invading or conquering other American nations. Indeed, there was a period in American history when it seemed to many of the Latin-American countries that the United States was “protecting” them from rather improbable aggression from Europe in order to swallow them herself, if not in actual conquest, at least by protectorates and faintly disguised financial control. The use of the Monroe Doctrine in the early part of this century as a cloak for a policy of American imperialism in the Caribbean caused great resentment among the Latin-Americans, which it has taken a great many goodwill tours to abate. In recent years the United States has been abandoning her imperialist policy, which came in for almost as much criticism at home as abroad, and under President Roosevelt has been making strenuous efforts to substitute the policy of “the good neighbor.”

The possibility of the invasion of Canada by the United States seems remote. Both countries are justly proud of the

unfortified boundary; they have settled their differences peaceably for over 100 years; and the United States has frequently expressed herself as satisfied with her present territory.

Armed Attack Permissible

TAOES THE Doctrine include protection against armed attacks of all kinds?

Not necessarily.

The United States has been fairly consistent in recognizing the right of foreign nations to make war on American nations for the redress of grievances, only insisting that such wars be not used as an excuse for the subjection of American states or the permanent occupation of American territory (the word “American” being here used in its widest application to the countries of both continents).

Of course, nothing in the Monroe Doctrine prevents one American nation from going to war with another American nation (as was recently evidenced in the Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay); nor does it prevent the United States from making war on her neighbors.

In the early years of the Doctrine, the Latin-American nations optimistically looked upon President Monroe’s message as a pledge of United States assistance in any troubles in which they might involve themselves with European nations. They were soon disabused of this idea.

Daniel Webster declared in Congress, in 1826, that the Monroe Doctrine “did not commit us at all events, to take up arms, on any indication of hostile feeling by the powers of Europe toward South America,” adding that it might be different if a fullyequipped army had been “landed on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and commenced the war in our immediate neighborhood.”

On various occasions when European powers have waged war against American nations and have bombarded Central or South American ports, the United States viewpoint has been quite clearly stated.

Even in the beginning of the Mexican trouble, which ended with the French conquest of that country, Secretary of State Cass advised: “While we do not

deny the right of any other power to carry on hostile operations against Mexico for the redress of its grievances, we firmly object to its holding possession of any part of that country, or endeavoring by force to control its political destiny.”

In the war between Spain and Peru in 1864, Secretary Seward met the Peruvian appeal for protection with the declaration that the United States would maintain her neutrality, but would insist that the republican system of government be not “wantonly assailed” or “subverted as an end of a lawful war by European powers.”

Seward further declared: “We therefore concede to every nation the right to make peace or war, for such causes, other than political or ambitious, as it thinks right and wise.”

W’hen, however, Spain authorized the Pacific squadron’s occupation of the Chincha Islands to take important resources from the enemy, the United States objected and Spain desisted.

The nations protected by the Monroe Doctrine have never been encouraged to think that they need not feel responsible for their own foreign relations and for such national conduct as might involve them in difficulties with non-American nations.

When the Germans were collecting claims against Haiti, in 1897, under threat of two war vessels, the Haitians appealed to the United States for protection and were told: “You certainly should not

proceed on the hypothesis that it is the duty of the United States to protect its American neighbors from the responsibili-

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Continued from page 30 ties which attend the exercise of independent sovereignty.”

Again in 1901, in the second Venezuelan incident, when the Germans attempted to collect claims by shelling a fort and bombarding Puerto Cabello, President Theodore Roosevelt told the Venezuelans: “We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that the punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power.” He brought pres^ sure to bear on the Germans only when they refused to arbitrate.

After this episode, however, he sponsored a policy of intervention in LatinAmerican affairs when the actions of any country “invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations.” In Santo Domingo, the United States took over temporary charge of the customs house for the settlement of foreign claims. Roosevelt reiterated the right of nations to punish wrongs to their citizens, but held that in cases of contractual obligations it was inadvisable to permit a foreign power to take control of customs houses, “for such temporary occupation” might turn into a permanent occupation.

Germany’s Promise to Stay Out of Canada

T)KRIIAPS few Canadians realize that the question of the invasion of Canada and its relation to the Monroe Doctrine was raised at the very beginning of the Great War. Within a month of the out1 break of war in 1914, the German Ambassador to Washington lodged with the Department of State a statement declaring that Germany, should she be victorious, had no intention of acquiring territory in South America from the war. Shortly afterward. Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, who was considered to be an unofficial reprei sentative of the German Government,

¡ enlarged and elaborated the statement: “If the Government of the United ! States wants assurances from Germany I that in the event of victory she will not I seek expansion or colonization in North America, including Canada, and also South America, Germany will give the assurances at once. Germany has not the slightest intention of violating any part or section of the Monroe Doctrine.”

Dr. Dernburg made the further amazing claim that for Canada to take part in the war at all was a violation of the Doctrine: “It is a wilful breach of the Monroe Doctrine for an American self-governing dominion to go to war, thereby exposing the American continent to a counterattack from Europe.”

This German’s assumption that Canada w-as in any way bound by the Monroe Doctrine is palpably absurd in view of the strictly unilateral character of the Doctrine itself. Nevertheless, there is a certain inevitable logic to his thinking—if Canada could send an army across the Atlantic to fight Germany, was there any reason why Germany should not be free to send an invading force into Canada in retaliation?

Dr. Herbert Kraus of the University of Leipzig, writing in the Atlantic Monthly in 1915, maintained that the Monroe Doctrine did not cover the invasion of Canada, quoting ex-President Taft in support of his opinion.

Whether such an attack on a belligerent Canada would have been allowed by a neutral United States, provided no permanent occupation was intended, was never put to the test, for the German Navy never had a chance to reach Canada, and the United States was soon herself a I belligerent on the Allies’ side.

Protection Not Pledged

WHEN would the United States defend Canada?

It seems fairly clear that President Roosevelt’s Quebec statement that the United States “can and will defend our| selves and defend our neighborhood” is

intended as a warning to any powers which may be cherishing aggressive dreams of the North American continent, but cannot be taken as a pledge upon which we may rely for protection from every form of attack to which Canada might be subjected in modern warfare.

There appears to be little doubt but that Canada can count on the unqualified protection of the United States in the case of unprovoked aggression—and certainly, if the United States was ready to threaten war over a boundary dispute in South America, she would be prepared to back her threats with the full force of army and navy if a serious invasion took place on her very doorstep.

Unquestionably, too, the United States would resist strenuously any attempt at the permanent occupation of Canada by a foreign power, whether as a colony, dependency or vassal state. Quite aside from her feeling of friendship for Canada, the United States would be most unwilling, from the point of view of her own selfprotection, to have an aggressive power established to the north of the 3,000 miles of unfortified boundary line.

But if Canada should be involved in a British or League war, she would have to be prepared to take her own responsibility in case of attack. Just what the United States stand would be in such an eventuality is still a moot question. If, for instance, Toronto or Montreal were bombed, would the United States, a member neither of the British Empire nor of the League of Nations, rush to our defense?

We certainly cannot assume that she would. Yet, as a neutral, she could not interfere in the progress of hostilities without herself being drawn into the war. Probably she would be unwilling to see harbors and strategic points in Canada occupied, as dangerous to her own safety. It is difficult to conceive of any attack on Canada which the United States could regard with indifference, from the point of view of her own self-protection. Yet all the United States carefully-erected policy of neutrality and isolation from European affairs, would be as useless as walls of sand, if any attack on Canada as a member of the British Empire or the League of Nations, were going to pull the Republic into war.

Is Neutrality Advisable?

WILL THE Monroe Doctrine affect Canada’s future foreign policy? Canada is at present in the happy position of being “doubly protected by membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations and under the mantle of the Monroe Doctrine,” said Sir Willmott Lewis, Washington correspondent for the London Times, to me in a recent conversation.

“One cannot conceive of the United States allowing a foreign power—say a dictatorship which had achieved hegemonyin Europe—to establish a dictatorship in Canada. Such an attempt of any European power would certainly have to overcome the opposition of the British Navy to reach Canada -and most certainly would face United States naval and military power here,” he declared.

Canada, however, would be placed in a very awkward position if there should ever be another Anglo-American war. In the event of a serious break between the United States and Great Britain, Sir Willmott believes that the President of the United States would immediately send Canada a very strong note, practically an ultimatum, asking her to state her position. In such a case, Canada would have to make up her mind whether she would side with the British Empire at the risk of instant invasion from the United States, or whether she would take an independent stand and maintain strict neutrality. Happily, there is no present probability of having to make such a choice —but such a contingency is not utterly impossible.

The more immediate issue—and one Continued on page 41

Would the U.S. Defend Canada?

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which may have to be faced at any time— is what position Canada will take in the event of a British war or a League war against European or Asiatic nations, the United States remaining neutral.

If Canada takes advantage of her geograohical position as a North American nation, relies on the protection of the Monroe Doctrine and follows the American neutral stand of lighting only if there is an invasion of the continent, can she maintain her place in the British Commonwealth of Nations and in the League of Nations?

Ii, on the other hand, the Dominion becomes involved in war through her Empire or League obligations, can she expect protection from a neutral l nited States in case of attack?

If Canada is going to take part in Empire wars or League wars, logically we must be prepared to fight our own battles.

If we are to rely on the United States for our defense on this continent, logically we would have to align ourselves more closely with United States foreign policy.

One other vital question remains to be j faced: Can Canada fight her own battles?

If the protection of the British Navv broke down under the new conditions ot aerial warfare could Canada successfully defend herself from an invadei?

If Canada brought war to a neutral Western hemisphere, how long would her battles be hers alone? Could war lie waged on Canadian soil without the United States, sooner or later, being drawn into the fray? is it possible for one country on the North American continent to carry out a foreign policy entirely independently of other North American countries, or are we all inextricably tied up together in such matters?

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